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ABSTRACT. There is an expansion of empirical research that at its core is an attempt 
to quantify the “feely” aspects of living in raced (and other stigmatized) bodies. This 
research is offered as part concession, part insistence on the reality of the “special” 
circumstances of living in raced bodies. While this move has the potential of making 
headway in debates about the character of racism and the unique nature of the harms 
of contemporary racism – through an analysis of stereotype threat research, micro- 
aggression research, and the reception of both discourses – I will argue that this 
scientization of the phenomenology of race and racism also stalls progress on the 
most significant challenges for the current conversation about race and racism: how 
to listen and how to be heard. 
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In the aftermath of George Zimmerman’s acquittal for both second-degree 
murder and manslaughter in the death of black teenager Trayvon Martin, 
Questlove – percussionist for The Roots and bandleader for The Tonight 
Show Band – wrote the poignant and aptly named piece, “Trayvon Martin and 
I Ain’t Shit” (Thompson 2013) expressing just how bad racism feels: 
 
I often tell cute, self-deprecating celebrity run-in stories that end 
with my own ‘pie in the face’ moment. But rarely do I share stories 
of a more serious nature, another genre of ‘pie in the face’ moments, 
mostly because in the age of social media, most people are quick 
to dismiss my tales as #FirstWorldProblems. But I can’t tell you 
how many times a year I’m in a serious situation, only to hear the 
magic words ‘Oh, wait … Questlove?’ Hey guys, it’s Questlove. 
‘We’re so sorry, you can go!’ Like, five to seven times a year, a 
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night ending in the words ‘Thank God for that Afro or we’d never 
have recognized you’ happens to me. 
      I’m in scenarios all the time in which primitive, exotic-looking 
me – six-foot-two, 300 pounds, uncivilized Afro, for starters – finds 
himself in places where people who look like me aren’t normally 
found. I mean, what can I do? I have to be somewhere on Earth, 
correct? In the beginning – let’s say 2002, when the gates of ‘Hey, 
Ahmir, would you like to come to [swanky elitist place]?’ opened 
– I’d say ‘no,’ mostly because it’s been hammered in my DNA to 
not ‘rock the boat,’ which means not making ‘certain people’ feel 
uncomfortable. 
      I mean, that is a crazy way to live. Seriously, imagine a life in 
which you think of other people’s safety and comfort first, before 
your own. You’re programmed and taught that from the gate. It’s 
like the opposite of entitlement. 
 
Here, he apologetically details the burden of managing what Erving Goffman 
(1986) calls a spoiled identity. His is what Paul Taylor (2004) would identify 
as one of the persistent narratives that unifies black folk: the story of how 
racism hunts you, haunts you, no matter what you do. In the time after the 
verdict, the internet spawned a number of these sorts of narratives1 – black 
men and women articulating the pervasive sense that they were both objec- 
tified and invisible, the profound sense that they really didn’t count or at least 
counted less, and experiences of a mainstay of contemporary racism: official 
and unofficial racial profiling. “Brave” celebrities like Questlove often had 
their narratives met with thanks and endearments, but like those from the 
less famous, these narratives were just as often met with combinations of 
doubt and minimization.   
      Folks positioned in the social structure to be beneficiaries of white 
supremacy unapologetically question or flat out deny the claims that the way 
some black man was treated (even in a scenario where the black man was 
present and the interlocutor was not) was racist. Specific subtle instances of 
racism, of the sort Questlove alludes to, are dismissed as oversensitivity or 
paranoia on the person of color’s part. The less strident responses don’t deny 
the charge of racism or the experience of the victim, but rather suggest that 
“this type of thing” – indications, expressions, and manifestations of racial 
hatred and scorn – is no longer a “real” problem in society but instead just 
the undertakings of a fringe set of wackadoos, those so far outside the sta- 
tistical norm that we can’t be expected to be accountable for them. Thus, the 
expression of outrage and frustration is an appropriate plea but directed to 
the wrong audience – “We’re the good guys, you’re preaching to the choir 
here; you should squelch that and save it for the bad guys.” The persistence 
of this experience – the experience of black testimony about the systematic 
nature and excruciating painfulness of racism being dismissed, denied, and 
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minimized even when that testimony comes from recognized experts2 – has 
led to the creation of a counteroffensive pathway for the discourse on race and 
racism: the scientization of the phenomenology3 of racism.  
      The central claim of this essay is this: there is an expansion of empirical 
research that at its core is an attempt to recapture the feely aspects of living 
in raced (and other stigmatized) bodies in a form that has the possibility of 
being understood as credible in virtue of how it reflects standards for em- 
pirical science.4 This research is offered as part concession, part insistence on 
the reality of the “special” circumstances of living in raced bodies. It reflects 
a tipping point in the conversation5 about race, hastened by social network- 
ing and its mobilization of marginalized groups. While this research has the 
potential to make headway in debates about the character of racism and the 
unique nature of the harms of contemporary racism, it does so in a way that 
is ambivalent about its own project. It explicitly invests in the quantifying of 
the harms of racism, while implicitly insisting upon the fact that racism hurts 
as well as harms and that this fact must matter.6   
      This essay will proceed, in section I, by analyzing the discourse on 
stereotype threat and highlighting its strengths as credible “evidence” of the 
harms of racism. To illustrate its value as a translator of the experience of 
racism, I will use it as a clarifying lens through which to view Questlove’s 
narrative of his experience. Next, in section II, I do a similar analysis of 
microaggressions research, noting how its perceived weakness as a discourse 
has resulted in a very different reception. In contrast to the fairly universal 
embracing of stereotype threat research, microaggression research has met 
with significant resistance despite the fact that it too provides a useful lens of 
analysis for experiences like Questlove’s. In section III, I will argue that the 
difference in how stereotype threat and microaggression research are received 
reveals a flaw in the strategy of trying to translate or reframe the testimony of 
folks of color into more “credible” forms. Specifically, this strategy concedes 
to what Kristie Dotson (2012) has called a “culture of justification.” I will 
argue that making that concession disguises the “inverted epistemology” that 
prevents any testimony to the hurts (and by extension the harms) of racism 
from ever being credible enough (Mills 1997). Stereotype threat and micro- 
aggressions will ultimately still be treated as special pleading (“See, we told 
you racism was hurting us”) until we address the inverted epistemology head 
on. Finally, I will suggest that despite the value of stereotype threat and micro- 
aggression research in making the testimony of people of color credible, they 







The last twenty years has seen an explosion of analysis aimed at chronicling 
and quantifying the more subtle aspects of the experience of racism. I will 
focus on two of the most influential approaches in this genre: stereotype 
threat and microaggression research. Each perspective is experiencing a peak 
in popularity and influence as evidenced by each having spawned focused 
websites aimed at dynamically cataloging the phenomena and the ongoing 
analysis of the phenomena7 and by an explosion of recent research on each 
that includes noteworthy books by prominent leading figures.8 While their 
paths are superficially similar, the reception of the claims made by research 
on microaggressions is profoundly different than to those made by stereotype 
threat research. While stereotype threat is all but universally well-received as 
a model theoretical posit, microaggressions are found to have severe limita- 
tions; the difference in the reception of these two approaches is symptomatic 
of the ongoing resistance to people of color’s testimony about the hurt and 
harms of racism. I will proceed, in this section and the next, by comparing 
stereotype threat and microaggression research, highlighting the strengths (or 
weaknesses) that lend them (or steal from them) their credibility. I will then 
test each discourse’s ability to successfully incorporate a narrative like the one 
offered by Questlove.  
      Stereotype threat was first documented by Claude Steele and Josh Aron- 
son (1995) in a series of studies that showed that a lower performance on the 
verbal portion of the GRE could be induced in a subject group of black 
undergraduates at University of Michigan when the test was characterized as 
an intelligence test. Since that original study, hundreds of additional studies 
have examined and revealed the dynamics of stereotype threat.9 Stereotype 
threat experiments have a typical form: Some test group (usually defined by 
social demographics, e.g. women, blacks, Asians, or more specifically, white 
men, homosexual men etc.) is tested on some skill. Social group identification 
is invoked – sometimes subtly, other times stereotypes are fully articulated. 
Finally, the skill performance of the test group and some control group – that 
either has a different social identity or has not been subjected to the invocation 
– are compared. Stereotype threat is confirmed when the test group is shown 
to have performed less well than the control group. In short, a negative 
stereotype made manifest to its targets at crucial moments causes them to 
conform to the stereotype, hence the name. One favorite explanation for stereo- 
type threat is that the additional cognitive effort – managing aroused stress, 
additional monitoring of performance, and suppressing negative thoughts and 
emotions – inhibits performance on the task.10 Stereotype threat research is, 
thus, evidence that the products of racism – negative stereotypes made salient 
explicitly or implicitly – create an additional obstacle to the success of people 
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of color. It proves that people of color are not just hurt but also substantially 
harmed by racism even when it is not violent, even when it is subtle, even 
when the harm is unintended.   
      The hundreds of studies that have been done on stereotype threat have 
revealed the phenomenon to be a model in its potential to provide credible 
proof of the impact of racism. Two qualities in particular stand out in explain- 
ing how stereotype threat is exemplary evidence for the injury of racism. 
Research on stereotype threat has proven it to be robust and its applications 
have been quite targeted. When I say that stereotype threat is robust, I mean 
to point to the fact that a variety of demographic groups (including white 
men) have been shown to be subject to stereotype threat on a variety of skills 
tasks.11 One just need locate the right stereotype. Aronson et al. (1999) were 
able to provoke a threat response on a difficult math test in white males with 
high SAT scores in math by pointing to the tendency of Asians to score higher 
on math tests. Stone et al. (2002) were able to provoke a threat response on a 
golf skills task by framing the test as a test of natural athletic ability. Women 
have been made to demonstrate reduced negotiation skills; gay men have been 
made to demonstrate reduced childcare skills; people with mental illness 
were made to perform poorly on tests of analytic ability; people with lower 
socioeconomic status (SES), Hispanics, and women have been made to 
demonstrate reduced math skills.12 This robustness plays a crucial role in de- 
fining stereotype threat data as evidence rather than anecdote, viable testimony 
as opposed to “whining.”   
      The way stereotype research has been applied further cements its status 
as a credible account of the injuries to marginalized identities. The kind of 
careful and controlled studies in stereotype threat make very targeted predic- 
tions most of which are about performance on various kinds of intellectual 
tasks, especially on tests of math and analytic reasoning skills.13 Not sur- 
prisingly, research on stereotype threat has had its greatest impact in the 
science of teaching and learning. Even Steele’s narrative about how he came 
to discover stereotype threat lends itself to this use. Steele was interested in 
accounting for why the performance of black students at the University of 
Michigan – specifically their grade point averages – did not accord with what 
would be predicted by their performance on standardized tests like the ACT 
college readiness assessment and the SAT Reasoning Test. The problem 
Steele was looking for had to be something that was occurring as part of the 
educational setting at the university (Steele 2010). Much stereotype threat 
research is invested in various ways in monitoring and improving classroom 
conditions for vulnerable groups. Much of the earnest investigation into the 
mechanisms of stereotype threat and nearly all of the research that strategizes 
how to dissipate, undermine, and minimize stereotype threat are classroom 
oriented. One of the strategies that is taken to show the most promise – 
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emphasizing incremental views of intelligence – is especially (possibly only) 
suited for use in educational settings (Good et al. 2003, Good et al. 2008). 
      Though stereotype threat research demonstrates a broad scope – it affects 
a variety of skill domains including intellectual (math and analytic reason- 
ing), emotional (social awareness, childcare, racial sensitivity), physical 
(athletic), and tasks that combine these domains like negotiation – the body 
of research as a whole largely concerns the domain of education, more 
precisely classroom contexts. Classroom contexts are more able to mimic the 
circumstances of controlled experiments: subjects are in the exact same phys- 
ical context, somewhat isolated from external and uncontrolled circumstances, 
and what they are exposed to can be very scrupulously controlled. This means 
that action on the conclusions demonstrated in research settings can, with 
minimal controversy, be applied in “real world” contexts.   
      Combined with the ongoing critical projects – research that shows that 
there is worrisome variation in what is necessary to produce the effect or 
how pronounced the effect is, research that argues that the performance gap 
between blacks and whites or men and women cannot be accounted for by 
stereotype threat – the robust and targeted nature of the body of stereotype 
threat research make its conclusions seem highly credible. The remaining 
question is how effectively can it translate reports about the mental labor and 
anguish necessary for being as a person of color into empirical data. Can it 
capture Questlove’s race-based suffering? Consider this:  
 
My friends know that I hate parking lots and elevators, not because 
they are places that danger could occur, but it’s a prime place in 
which someone of my physical size can be seen as a dangerous 
element. One night, I get in the elevator, and just as the door 
closes this beautiful woman gets on. So I press my floor number, 
and I ask her, ‘What floor, ma’am?’ (Yes, I say ‘ma’am,’ because 
… sigh, anyway.) She says nothing, stands in the corner. Mind 
you, I just discovered the Candy Crush app, so if anything, I’m the 
rude one because I’m more obsessed with winning this particular 
level than anything else. There’s no way I can be a threat to a 
woman this fine if I’m buried deep in this game – so surely she 
feels safe….   
      I thought she was on my floor because she never acknowledged 
my floor request... So door opens and I flirt, ‘Ladies first.’ She says, 
‘This is not my floor.’ Then I assume she is missing her building 
card, so I pulled my card out to try to press her floor yet again. She 
says, ‘That’s okay.’ Then it hit me: ‘Oh God, she purposely held 
that information back.’ The door closed. I laughed at it. Sort of. 
 
In this narrative, Questlove is clearly struggling to disconfirm the stereotypes 
that define him as a dangerous predator.14 He focuses on signifiers of polite- 
ness (“ma’am,” “Ladies first,” offering assistance); he buries himself in his 
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game to appear uninterested. Of course, because he initially misses the cue 
that she doesn’t want him to know what floor she lives on, he appears extra 
interested in that information when he inquires again. He has missed aspects 
of the context that his training in management of being a black man requires 
him to notice. He has failed to appear as an innocuous, helpful neighbor as he 
intended and instead appears suspiciously interested in knowing the location 
of an apparently vulnerable woman. Establishing that an experience like 
Questlove’s falls into the domain of stereotype threat would lend his nar- 
rative considerable credibility. Before it can fall into such a domain, however, 
there is another credibility hurdle to overcome.  
      Questlove’s experience while clearly modeling the features of stereotype 
threat – his race is made salient to him in a context where stereotypes predict 
certain behaviors from him and despite efforts not to, he nonetheless con- 
firms those stereotypes – is far too dissimilar from experimental contexts; 
the context is too real. Without the restrictions of a controlled experiment (or 
a setting that is very much like one) we can’t be sure what causes his 
difficulties. Maybe he is just bad at reading social cues; maybe, as his inner 
dialogue suggests, he just is a “walking rape nightmare” regardless of his 
best intentions. Part of the virtue of the targeted nature of stereotype threat 
research is that it focuses on what can be rigorously demonstrated empirically; 
it focuses on what is most credible. Questlove’s experience doesn’t quite fit 




Research on and conceptualization of microaggressions actually predates 
stereotype threat research: the term was first dubbed in 1977 by Chester M. 
Pierce and his colleagues in an experiment aimed at documenting proracist 
attitudes in commercials.15 More recently, Derald Wing Sue (2010) has 
clarified and expanded the notion making clear that people can be subjected 
to microaggressions based on gender, sexual orientation, disability, class and 
religion as well as race. Microaggressions, according to Sue, are “brief and 
commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities… 
intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative 
slights and insults to the target person or group” (Sue 2007, 273). He further 
clarifies by identifying three forms of microaggressions: microassaults, ex- 
plicit, intentional verbal and nonverbal derogations; microinsults, more subtle 
communications of rudeness or insensitivity that demean racial heritage or 
identity and are often unintentional; and microinvalidations, communications 
that negate or nullify the thoughts and/or experiences of people of color (274). 
Sue’s goal was to enlist the concept of microaggressions in the project of 
explicitly classifying the subtle and nebulous phenomena associated with the 
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covert racism that is particular to contemporary Western societies. Micro- 
aggressions are shown to cause mental and physical health problems as well 
as impeding the task performance of people of color (Sue et al. 2008; Clark 
et al. 1999). This is all in addition to the experiences of being excluded, 
unwanted, invalidated and rejected. Microaggression research catalogs the 
variety of subtle ways that people of color are derogated, demeaned, and 
dismissed. It also proves that these pervasive communications have lasting 
negative effects that are both material – foreclosing opportunities for people 
of color – and phenomenological – significantly impacting what it feels like 
to live as a person of color. 
      Let us again consider Questlove’s experience and ask whether or not 
microaggressions can successfully capture it. Microaggressions abound in 
Questlove’s narrative. What Sue (2007, 275) would call a microinvalidation 
in the category “alien in one’s own land” is in effect. Who he thinks he is 
isn’t relevant; that he’s at home isn’t relevant. As a man of color, Questlove 
isn’t even free to just be in his own building. His earnest internal dialogue 
that reveals a sensitive, generous, and genuine person is not relevant to the 
issue of whether he can/should be read as “dangerous.” The microinsult of 
“assumption of criminality” is also on display. Her withholding of information 
that would be used to be helpful clearly communicates that she believes that 
even giving him her floor number might put her in jeopardy, that he is some- 
thing to be feared and avoided. Questlove’s experience fits perfectly with much 
of the research on microaggressions. In fact, the research on microaggressions 
is full of stories just like this one. This feature of microaggressions – its 
apparently uncritical reception of the testimony of people of color – has been 
a source of controversy in this literature. If stereotype threat research is a 
model of credible evidence of the harms of contemporary racism, micro- 
aggression research is the red-headed stepchild.    
      The differences between how the research on stereotype threat and micro- 
aggression would integrate Questlove’s narrative and how that alters each 
discourse’s perceived credibility reveals the missing widget in the machine 
that is meant to turn the testimony of people of color into recognized credible 
evidence of the harms of racism. Let’s now take a closer look at micro- 
aggression research’s credibility problems.  
      Chester Pierce’s own account of his initial study portends the struggles 
with credibility that current research on microaggressions faces (Pierce 1977). 
The experimenters attempted to predict how people of color were likely to be 
represented in commercials if those commercials reflected, reinforced, and/or 
promoted racist ideology. Using a practical theory of racism developed by 
Pierce as a theoretical foundation, the researchers then made predictions as 
to how blacks would be presented (that blacks would be seen less frequently 
than animals, seen to eat more frequently than whites, have less involvement 
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in family life, work for wages, etc.). Then two researchers (one black, one 
white), coded the commercials, compared their analyses, and resolved disputes 
between the two in order to determine if the predictions were confirmed or 
not. Pierce is sensitive to the subjective elements of this experiment and so 
begins the reporting on this research with this caveat,  
 
The first step in this sort of experiment is the elaboration of state- 
ments of expected behavior. The subtlety, accuracy, and meticulous- 
ness of these statements depends on both the perception and theory 
of the observer….The recognition of this concept, though seemingly 
antiscientific (emphasis added), is of special concern to the execution 
and interpretation of racial studies. From the view of the authors, 
an interracial team, almost all that is taught and believed by Amer- 
ican citizens about racism suffers seriously because of the failure 
to do studies from the viewpoint and theory of minority members.  
The study to be described is based on a theory of racism by a black 
(Pierce 1977, 62). 
 
In this statement, Pierce fingerposts the challenge facing microaggressions 
research and, by extension, the entire enterprise of trying to use empirical 
models to boost the credibility of the first person reports by people of color 
about the harms of racism. At the end of the day, whether or not this research 
will be perceived as credible will be determined by two things: 1) the degree 
to which it relies on testimony from people of color and 2) how credible the 
target audience finds such testimony independently of this research.   
      It turns out that microaggression research lacks both the robustness and 
the targetedness of stereotype threat research. These flaws correlate with the 
two criteria for perceived credibility above. I’ll discuss the lack of robust- 
ness first. Like Pierce, Sue’s initial focus was on racial microaggressions; for 
this reason, it was criticized as problematically narrow. It was only later – in 
his comprehensive analysis of microaggressions (Sue 2010) – that he began to 
discuss and analyze microaggressions based on gender, sexuality, disability, 
etc. While this analysis of microaggressions is clearly more robust than its 
predecessors, there is one noteworthy group whose experience seems to be 
excluded from the discourse: class privileged white men. Though the definition 
doesn’t require it, microaggression research seems to presuppose an asym- 
metry in the capacity to perpetrate a microaggression; the victims of micro- 
aggressions are always members of socially disadvantaged groups and the 
perpetrators are always relatively privileged.16 Outside the academy, the 
failure to theorize a symmetrical injury against those with race, class, gender, 
etc., privilege is a glaring exclusion. Microaggression research is found to be 
suspicious because, unlike stereotype threat research, it does not offer instances 
where men or white folk or the rich experience microaggressions qua their 
identities as men, white folk, or rich.   
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      The Wikipedia page (and the related “Talk” page)17 on microaggressions 
is revealing especially when compared to Wikipedia’s page on stereotype 
threat. When I first viewed the Wikipedia page on microaggressions it was 
flagged for being biased (its “neutrality” was “disputed”). Upon reviewing 
the article, I agreed with the assessment. It was filled with uncited criticisms 
of microaggressions and subtle and not so subtle allusions to the invalidity of 
the entire enterprise. Upon reviewing the Talk page, however, those were not 
the reasons the article was flagged.18 A large portion of the discussion of bias 
referred to the lack of a discussion of corresponding phenomenon to which 
white folk are subjected. It was also described as “ridiculous” and a “tool 
invented by white race-panderers for use by minority race-hustlers.” My con- 
tention is not that there were no problems with the article. What interests me 
is the nature of the discussion of those problems. Compared to the stereotype 
threat page, the discussion was contentious, polemical, and populated by a 
much larger number of unsigned comments. The heart of my concern is 
captured by this comment (Wikipedia 2014a):   
Wikipedian 1: This whole article comes across as ludicrous to 
me. It seems to have no credibility to me primarily because it is 
completely one-sided. I am on the receiving end of both personal 
and institutional ‘microagressive treatment’ all the time. I think that 
at least half if not more of the people you talked to would think 
that this is a ridiculous article – whether or not there are studies –
which are notoriously manipulable – [sic] support them. Could it 
be that some people, dare I say blacks or Hispanics, might be more 
than a little hypersensitive?  
Wikipedian 2: Could it be that some people, dare I say straight 
white cisgendered men, might be more than a little insensitive to 
the experiences of people unlike themselves. 
 
The “robustness” that marks stereotype threat research as credible but that 
microaggression research cannot quite achieve is of a particular sort. Up to 
now, microaggression research fails to theorize microaggressions against 
those who are generally or relatively privileged. The credibility earned by 
being robust requires not just a generally broad and inclusive explanatory 
scope; it requires inclusions that reflect (or are at least commensurate with) 
the perspectives and viewpoints of very particular groups: those at the top of 
the social hierarchy. Without this particular robustness, one is forced to rely 
on testimony from people of color. 
      Microaggression research is also not targeted in the same way that stereo- 
type threat research is. Stereotype threat research is able to impose the 
structure of experimental conditions onto the real world and thereby contain 
racism and its effects. It gives us specific tools to address specific conditions. 
Microaggression research seems to work in the opposite way. The research is 
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infected by the loose unstructured nature of reality, of painful human expe- 
rience. It seems that almost anything is a potential posit of microaggression 
research and that makes the credibility of the source – the testimony of 
people of color – that much more important. Without the kind of targeted 
applications you find in stereotype threat research, one is forced to trust the 




In his The Racial Contract (1997), Charles Mills articulates an “epistemology 
of ignorance” that is a function of participation in a racially structured hier- 
archy that systematically makes and maintains racial groups and the material 
advantages and disadvantages that go along with membership within them. 
This is an advance on previous arguments that beneficiaries of racism are 
willfully ignorant of the ways that they have unjustly benefitted at the expense 
of others.19 The notion of willful ignorance seems to run afoul of the logic of 
knowing. In trying not to know something, it seems you are hopelessly 
connected to and aware of the very knowing that you are trying to avoid. An 
epistemology of ignorance resolves this incoherence. The problem is not with 
some particular bit of knowledge, but rather with one’s way of knowing. A 
corrupted system of knowledge can produce semi-truths and falsehoods 
without thrusting the knower onto the dilemma of trying not to know.      
      My contention is that despite best intentions and real contributions to 
clarifying the features of contemporary racism, both stereotype threat and 
microaggression research have become entangled in a corrupted system of 
knowledge that produces semi-truths while disguising its own corruption. 
Specifically, what superficially appears to be a neutral lens of analysis by 
which the discourse on racism can be improved – increasing the credibility 
of testimony about the hurts of racism by translating it into data on the harms 
of racism – actually serves to disguise and further entrench the idea that the 
people of colors’ first-person accounts of the hurts and harms of racism are 
not credible.20 In order to reveal this particular inverted epistemology, I will 
take advantage of insights about “cultures of justification” gleaned from Kristie 
Dotson’s “How Is This Paper Philosophy?” (2012).   
      A culture of justification, according to Dotson, is one in which partici- 
pation in the knowledge making practice requires that one’s position be made 
congruent with acceptable norms (6). As a consequence, such a culture 
places high value on the endeavor to demonstrate legitimacy, the process of 
proving that your position is commensurate with the accepted norms. The 
ability to demonstrate legitimacy presupposes that there are commonly-held 
norms of acceptance and that those norms are relevant to any and all knowl- 
edge making projects (7). In such a culture, the project of proving that your 
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perspective accords with some “received” standard is valuable in itself. It 
isn’t simply valuable as a means to the end of establishing a more secure 
knowledge base. Demonstrating the harmony of your beliefs becomes the 
project. With this demonstration of congruence foregrounded, made inherently 
valuable, the possibility that there is no set of commonly held norms that are 
relevant in every case slides far into the background. The criticism of the 
purported common norms becomes a project for another day.   
      Stereotype threat and microaggression research are legitimation projects.  
They are endeavors to demonstrate that narratives like Questlove’s can be re-
presented in a form that respects the community standards for credible knowl- 
edge claims. In this way, folks of color are not just asking to be trusted.  
They are willing to “prove” the truth of their claims. They will embed their 
narratives in respected scientific procedures and conform to the neutral 
standards of those practices. Stereotype threat and microaggression research 
will be evaluated in accord with independent, shared, always-pertinent 
standards – robustness and being targeted. In this way, sad stories will be 
transformed into science. If they can’t be, they must be rejected as uncon- 
vincing.          
      Dotson goes on to articulate how cultures of justification can manifest, 
become informed by, and disguise systematic exclusions. Exclusions are 
positions that cannot or will not be legitimated; they may in fact be excluded 
from even the possibility of engaging in legitimation projects. Some perspec- 
tives are excluded as exceptional. These perspectives are excluded despite 
meeting supposed shared norms usually as a result of the historical privileg- 
ing of a competing perspective (12). Some perspectives are excluded because 
they are incongruent; they do not share the “accepted norms” or those norms 
are not relevant to their project (13).  
      The analysis of stereotype threat and microaggression research shows that, 
at the end of the day, the testimonies of people of color to their experience of 
the hurts and harms of racism are still excluded perspectives. While it is 
sometimes possible to demonstrate the illegitimacy of that exclusion – to 
show that this testimony does at times accord with some shared norms – the 
commitment to the exclusion remains resilient despite the countervailing 
evidence. Still more difficult is the fact that in certain respects the testimony 
of people of color about their experience of racism is incongruent with the 
acceptable norms. I will unpack these two claims – that analysis of stereotype 
threat research shows that testimony about racism has been unfairly excluded 
and that analysis of microaggression research shows that to a certain degree 
testimony about racism is excluded in virtue of incongruity – in a little more 
detail. 
      Earlier, I suggested that one consequence of a culture of justification is that 
critical engagement with the specifics of the relevant culture and its purported 
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common norms is postponed indefinitely. To see how the testimony of 
people of color about how racism hurts and harms them has been excluded, 
one must engage in that critique. For the sake of argument, let’s assume that 
racism testimony is being required to conform to the accepted norms of a 
culture that has engaged in a dynamic, multi-century white supremacy project 
that has created substantial disproportions in the distribution of wealth, other 
material goods, and nonmaterial goods. Let’s assume that the unjust racial 
hierarchy is just one among a number of unjust hierarchies that ensures that 
the vast majority of resources have been bestowed on a ridiculously small 
segment of the population. Let’s assume that over time these unjust hier- 
archies have been played against each other in ways that disguise this fact: 
the fact that the majority of both material and immaterial goods have been 
unjustly bestowed on a precious few. The standards for credibility “shared” 
by the members of this culture have grown up alongside this extended period 
of racial (and other) oppression. It’s not surprising that historically testimony 
from people of color about the hurts and harms of racism has been excluded 
outright – at first because they didn’t have standing to testify to anything (they 
were not persons), then because they didn’t have the intellectual capacity to 
accurately interpret their own experience, and finally because they couldn’t 
be trusted to honestly interpret their experience.   
      Science – rigorous empirical investigation – establishes practices and 
norms that have the potential to work around the limitations that explained 
the outright exclusion. Stereotype threat research doesn’t need to rely on 
people of color to testify to how they are harmed by racism; it allows those 
harms to be measured independently of their testimony. The cost of according 
with those standards – specifically of being targeted – is that efforts to apply 
the conclusions to real world settings are restricted to contexts that lack the 
loose, complex structure that characterizes most of the real world. Efforts to 
try to apply stereotype threat outside of places like classrooms can be rejected 
as unconvincing. Furthermore, microaggression research is found to be robust, 
but not sufficiently so because the standard for robustness is inappropriately 
balanced toward including the perspective of the privileged. Ultimately, micro- 
aggression research relies too much on testimony without working around the 
reasons for exclusion. It demands that people of color be viewed as credible 
– capable and earnest – witnesses to their own experience. Microaggression 
research rejects an accepted norm of our hypothetical culture: it refuses to 
believe that accounts of racism can only be made credible if they can work 
around the testimony of people of color or at least include the testimony of 
the privileged.   
      At the outset of this essay, I claimed that one goal of stereotype threat 
and microaggression research was to recapture testimony about the hurts and 
harms of racism. This “recapturing” was achieved by lending the credibility 
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of science to this testimony. My analysis argues that, while well intentioned, 
the scientization of the phenomenology of racism is a double-edged sword.  
Specifically, the differences in how microaggression research and stereotype 
threat research have been received reveal a persisting refusal to acknowledge 
the credibility of testimony by people of color. As I conclude this essay, I’d 
like to briefly explore the possibility that this new spate of empirical research 
aims at more than just making the testimony of people of color credible.  
      The difficulty exposed by my analysis is that though this new research 
avenue lends the credibility of science to testimony by people of color, it 
seems it must do so by tacitly endorsing ideology that silences people of color 
by casting them as always-already irrational or biased about racism. If just 
garnering credibility for those voices were the only goal, this result would be 
a tragic irony. I don’t think that making that testimony credible is the only 
goal. I don’t think proving that people of color have been hurt and harmed by 
racism is the only goal. Questlove writes this about the aftermath of realizing 
that after all his efforts, he has been perceived as a threat all along anyway: 
 
Inside I cried. But if I cried at every insensitive act that goes on in 
the name of safety, I’d have to be committed to a psych ward. I’ve 
just taught myself throughout the years to just accept it and maybe 
even see it as funny. But it kept eating at me (Well, I guess she 
never watched the show …  My English was super clear … I called 
her ‘ma’am’ like I was Webster … Those that know you know that 
you’re cool, but you definitely know that you are a walking rape 
nightmare – right, Ahmir? Of course she was justified in not 
saying her floor. That was her prerogative! You are kinda scary-
looking, I guess?). It’s a bajillion thoughts, all of them self-
depreciating voices slowly eating my soul away.   
      But my feelings don’t count. I don’t know why it’s that way. 
Mostly I’ve come to the conclusion that people over six feet and 
over weight regulation or as dark as me…simply don’t have feel- 
ings. Or it’s assumed we don’t have feelings. 
 
What if the goal of testifying was not always to provide proof but also to give 
those voices the opportunity to be counted, to be heard?  
      The focus on quantifying the harm, ignores the significance of express- 
ing the hurt. The burden of contemporary racism is to suffer the setback of 
interests in silence, to have your exclusion be reified in the supposedly 
neutral structures for evaluating your testimony, and to feel alienated from 
yourself and the world in the management of it all. By trying to scientize the 
testimony of people of color, stereotype threat and microaggression research 
attests to the value of the testimony. In trying to ensure that these traditionally 
silenced voices are heard, this body of research rejects the supposed shared 
norms of credibility while exploiting them. The continued development of 
stereotype threat and microaggression research is its own form of testimony. 
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It testifies to the central import of interpreting and experiencing one’s life, 
including the pain, through sharing it with others, not to prove your injury, but 
instead to demonstrate your humanity. Furthermore, it places those efforts by 
people of color to interpret their selves and revel in their own humanity at 
the center of a discourse. They become the focus of the conversation. A few 
days after the Zimmerman verdict, Questlove received an email from a friend: 
 
[He] said, ‘I am wrong about many things, but I want to apologize 
for taking that particular story you told me too lightly.’ The one 
about the woman in the elevator. And it kinda touched me. My 
friend related to me.  
 
While stereotype threat and microaggression research invests in the clarifica- 
tion and quantification of the harms of racism, at the same time, it demands 
that we get past all the discussion of proof and get down to the business of 
relating to each other, of telling our own stories and making sure that every- 




1. Here are just a few examples of note. What interests me most is the discussion 
of these stories (the comments). No matter how egregious the incident some percent- 
age of the population of readers has a counter-explanation. Academic Brittney 
Cooper discusses being referred to as the N-word by the woman adjacent to her on a 
plane (Cooper 2013); A white women walking with her two black sons is stopped by 
eleven officers (Balko 2013); Two black men bringing a young white girl to a dance 
competition are detained by police (Kemp 2013); and a female television corres- 
pondent is searched because she “matches a description” of an armed and dangerous 
black man (Pettis 2013). 
2. For an extreme example from recent history consider Henry Louis Gates arrest 
for disorderly conduct outside his own home (Thompson 2010) and the subsequent 
resistance to his claim that this treatment was at least partially motivated by race. 
3. My use of the term phenomenology is bound to be disappointing to all parties.  
While no doubt influenced by the insights from the conception of phenomenology 
found in the continental traditions, particularly existentialism, it should also be 
understood as akin to the use of the term (and it’s close cousin “phenomenal”) in use 
in the analytic philosophy of mind. I mean to refer to the first-person, feely aspects 
of what it’s like to be a person of color.  
4. For examples, cf. Alfano 2014, Kozma and Schroer 2014, and MacKinnon 2014. 
5. The “conversation” I have in mind is the one that tends to occupy territories 
like the United States that have both a history of being on the domination side of 
colonialism and are currently places where multiple races and ethnies are living in 
relatively close proximity as fellow citizens of what is ostensibly one nation.   
6. Throughout this essay I will distinguish between “hurts” – the pain, suffering, 
and unpleasant feely aspects of the experience of racism (or any other form of 
oppression) – and “harms” – a measurable setback of interests. My point here is to 
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try to recognize and appreciate but not necessarily endorse a distinction that is often 
made.   
7. Cf. www.reducingstereotypethreat.org and www.microaggressions.com. 
8. Claude Steele’s Whistling Vivaldi and Other Clues to How Stereotypes Affect 
Us and Derald Wing Sue’s Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Race, Gender and 
Sexual Orientation both from 2010. 
9. Reducingstereotypethreat.org has cataloged a few hundred published studies 
on stereotype threat.   
10. Cf. Blascovich et al. 2001, Croizet et al. 2004, Beilock et al, 2006.  
11. Robustness is akin to the traditional scope criterion that is used to judge 
scientific theories. Theories that can explain a wider range of phenomena are superior; 
in this case, the criterion also suggests a minimum threshold for adequacy. Cf. 
Vaughn 2012, 355–6.   
12. In Kray et al. 2002, Bosson et al. 2004, Quinn et al. 2004, Croizet and Claire 
1998, Gonzales et al. 2002, and Good et al. 2008 respectively. 
13. Being targeted is related to the traditional criterion of testability used to judge 
scientific theories. Superior theories have clear methods for determining whether or 
not they are true; in this case they can point to a specific criterion for including or 
excluding phenomena and will abide by such. Cf. Vaughn 2012, 355–6.   
14. For a thoughtful analysis of the phenomenology of the “Elevator Effect,” cf. 
Yancy 2008.  
15. Ironically, for simplicity, the discussion of microaggressions in this essay 
will refer primarily to lead authors Chester Pierce and Derald Wing Sue despite the 
fact that much of their research was conducted and published by teams of thinkers.  
The failure to refer to the secondary authors, many of whom are women and people 
of color, is an instance of microinvalidation. So, special thanks goes to Jean V. Carew, 
Diane Pierce-Gonzalez, and Deborah Wills who worked on Pierce’s original study and 
Christina M. Capodilupo, Gina C. Torino, Jennifer M. Bucceri, Aisha M. B. Holder, 
Kevin L. Nadal, Marta Esquilin, Annie I. Lin, and David P. Rivera who co-authored 
two of Sue’s important papers on microaggressions. 
16. The symmetry/asymmetry concern here is akin to the debate in racism: whether 
it makes more sense to construe racism symmetrically – an action that any member 
of any racial or ethnic community is equally able to commit against any member of 
any other racial or ethnic community – or asymmetrically – where the term “racism” 
is reserved for acts committed by people with a history of racial privilege against 
people with a history of racial disadvantage. Lawrence Blum (1999, 2002) argues for a 
symmetrical conception of racism while Marilyn Friedman (1999) articulates reasons 
to prefer asymmetry. Microaggression research seems to have sided with those who 
theorize racism asymmetrically viewing the “real work” to be on populations who 
are already socially disadvantage, marginalized, and/or oppressed. 
17. Every Wikipedia entry includes a discussion of the subject matter (identified 
as the “Article”) and a discussion of development of the Article (identified as “Talk”). 
Articles in particularly bad shape are flagged asking for assistance in resolving what- 
ever issues the article has and directing one to the talk page for insights about how to 
do so. 
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18. It is necessary to note the much discussed demographics of Wikipedians – 
the editors of Wikipedia pages. They are disproportionately male, English speakers, 
from Europe or North America. There is reason to believe, because of these 
demographics, that their perspectives on microaggressions and stereotype threat are 
unrepresentative. I would argue that though their demographic is not representative 
of the various intellectual communities in which these topics might be discussed it is 
representative of the dominant discourse in those communities. The intellectual 
communities in which these issues are being discussed are burdened by the same 
cultural hegemony that burdens most communities in the Western world.  
19. Cf. Frye 1983, 118.  
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